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SPENDING CLAUSE—GRAVE DECEPTIONS: REMEDYING CEMETERY 
MISFEASANCE THROUGH CONGRESS’S CONDITIONAL SPENDING POWER 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LITIGATION 
     Good friend, for Jesus’ sake forbeare 
To digg the dust enclosed heare; 
Blest be the man that spares these stones, 
And curst be he that moves my bones.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The excavation and desecration of sepulchral remains were 
common practices among grave-robbers in Shakespeare’s era.2  
However, many are unaware that these nefarious practices continue 
today at the behest of profit-driven cemetarians.3  In 1978, Matthew 
Williams,4 a loving father, was laid to rest in Burr Oak Cemetery.5  
 
1. SCOTT FREDERICK SURTEES, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OF STRATFORD-ON-AVON: 
HIS EPITAPH UNEARTHED AND THE AUTHOR OF THE PLAYS RUN TO GROUND 11 (1888) 
(denoting William Shakespeare’s Epitaph); see CHRISTY DESMET & ROBERT SAWYER, 
SHAKESPEARE AND APPROPRIATION 16 (2002) (noting the bard’s fear of grave robbers: 
“[S]hakespeare was acutely aware of the ironic and violent fate a poet’s [grave] might 
suffer . . . .”). 
2. See KEVERNE SMITH, SHAKESPEARE AND SON: A JOURNEY IN WRITING AND 
GRIEVING 97 (2011) (explaining that in Renaissance England, “[i]t was not uncommon for 
bones to be moved when a new grave was being dug; in most cases it seems that bones that 
were in the way were put to one side . . . while the new grave was being dug, and then 
reburied.”  Thus, Shakespeare, in his final mark, cursed all those who wished to move his 
bones).  
3. For purposes of this Note, a cemetarian is one who owns, operates, or apparently 
controls a cemetery.  
4. Oversight of Cemeteries and Other Funeral Services: Who’s in Charge?  Hearing on 
H.R. 3655 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (Statement of Roxie Williams) 
[hereinafter Statement of Roxie Williams], available at http://democrats.energycommerce.hou 
se.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final-Transcript-CTCP-Oversight-Cemetaries-Funeral-Se 
rvices-2009-7-27.pdf; see also Company Overview of Perpetua-Burr Oak Holdings of Illinois 
LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2014,  10:31 AM), http://investing.businessweek. 
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=106785066 (explaining that Burr Oak 
Cemetery is owned by Perpetua-Burr Oak Holdings and is a limited liability company located 
in Alsip, Illinois).  The memorial garden is known as one of the few cemeteries that targets the 
burial needs of the African-American community and is renowned as the final resting place of 
many notable and historic figures including Emmitt Till, among others. See Burr Oak History, 
BURR OAK CEMETERY, http://theburroakcemetery.com/burr-oak-history/ (last visited May 6, 
2014). 
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Matthew’s death was unexpected and shocked his wife and young 
children.6  In hopes of paying final respects, his family selflessly scraped 
together enough money to purchase a beautiful headstone.7  But, when 
Matthew’s children visit his grave today, the headstone that his family 
struggled to purchase in 1978 is missing, and Matthew’s plot no longer 
exists.8 
A 2009 investigation into the sprawling 159-acre cemetery revealed 
that groundskeepers had uprooted more than 300 bodies from their final 
resting places to make room for new graves.9  To carry out this plan, 
employees destroyed expensive caskets and sentimental headstones—
and most egregiously—discarded beloved human remains into a mass 
grave known as the “cemetery dump.”10  Cook County Sheriff and lead 
investigator, Tom Dart, noted “we found femurs, skulls, parts of jaws, 
just lying out in the open.”11  For five years, cemetery officials had been 
removing remains from burial plots and reselling them to unsuspecting 
consumers—for profit.12  Burr Oak officials were unable to provide 
authorities with adequate records and had no knowledge of which 
remains had been moved.13  As a result, families have been searching the 
burial grounds for their loved ones for years.14 
In the United States, seventy-three percent of deaths each year 
result in traditional casket burials,15 yet the cemetery industry remains 
unregulated at the federal level.16  When a tragedy occurs, bereaved 
 
5. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 16.  
6. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 18-19. 
7. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 18-19. 
8. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 20. 
9. Cemeteries Draw Complaints, CBS NEWS-60 MINUTES (May 17, 2012), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57436612/cemeteries-draw-complaints/.  
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. On other occasions, groundskeepers were ordered to “double stack” remains to 
maximize burial space.  Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See Ryan Mark et. al., Burr Oak Cemetery: Browse the headstones, CHI. TRIB., July 
30, 2009, http://archive.is/HQQkE (listing pictures of all the unclaimed headstones found in 
the aftermath of the Burr Oak scandal).  
15. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-65, DEATH  SERVICES: STATE 
REGULATION OF THE DEATH CARE INDUSTRY VARIES AND OFFICIALS HAVE MIXED VIEWS 
ON NEED FOR FURTHER FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 7 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, DEATH 
SERVICES] (denoting that the National Center for Health Statistics preliminary data shows that 
there were approximately 2,473,018 deaths in 2008 and 2,436,682 deaths in 2009).  
16. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2013) (setting forth the “Funeral Rule,” but failing 
to include independent cemetery operations unrelated to the direct operation of  a funeral 
home).  
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consumers have little time to investigate cemeteries or bargain-shop for 
reasonably priced burial goods and services.17  As a result, consumers 
are denied the opportunity to use the same diligence traditionally 
practiced in more usual transactions.18 
Congress recognized the unique characteristics of the death care 
trade and conferred upon the Federal Trade Commission the authority to 
regulate funeral providers through the Funeral Rule.19  While the 
Funeral Rule affords comprehensive consumer price protections for 
consumers who patronize the funeral industry,20 it affords no such 
protections to consumers in the cemetery industry.21  This lack of 
oversight has led to the possibility of misfeasance and negligent 
mismanagement.22 
This Note argues that the federal government should intervene 
using its constitutional power to spend, and encourage states to adopt 
“Minimum Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines.”23  These 
guidelines seek to ensure that cemetery operations—like other trades—
 
17. An AARP Report explains that, at most, people who purchased burial plots may 
have looked at one other plot before making the final selection.  See RACHELLE CUMMINS, 
AARP KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, AARP FINANCIAL PROTECTION: NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND 
FOR-PROFIT CEMETERIES SURVEY 4 (2000), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consu 
me/cemetery_survey.pdf. 
18. See Grief, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/dis 
ease/grief/overview (last visited May 14, 2014).  
19. See Funeral Rule 16 C.F.R. § 453.1 (2013). 
20. For the purposes of this Note the funeral industry provides funeral services.  The 
term “funeral services” is defined as any service which may be used to: “(1) [c]are for and 
prepare deceased human bodies for burial, cremation or other final disposition; and (2) 
[a]rrange, supervise or conduct the funeral ceremony or the final disposition of deceased 
human bodies.”  Id. § 453.1(j).  A “funeral provider” is defined as any “person, partnership or 
corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods and funeral services to the public.”  Id. § 
453.1(i). 
21. “Traditionally, the Rule has not applied to cemeteries because while cemeteries 
often offer funeral goods and a funeral ceremony, as a general matter, they do not prepare 
deceased bodies for burial and so do not meet the definition of ‘funeral provider.’”  See 
Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 
13740, 13744 (Mar. 14, 2008).  
22. “ Misfeasance is commonly defined as the improper performance of an act that one 
may lawfully do.”  Andrew L. Weitz, Contractor Duty to Third Parties Not in Privity: A 
Quasi-Tort Solution to the Vexing Problem of Victims of Nonfeasance, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 
593, 627 n.40 (1997).  For the purposes of this Note, misfeasance is highlighted by 
cemetarians mismanaging burial grounds, overcharging bereaved consumers for goods and 
services, or intentionally failing to disclose itemized pricing information.  Burr Oak is an 
extreme example offered to depict the severity of the abuses in the cemetery industry and is an 
example of malfeasance as the cemetery provider(s) in question had no legal right to remove 
remains from entombed graves. 
23. See infra App. A. 
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are legally bound to provide the most basic consumer protections.24 
Part I of this Note introduces the Funeral Rule and explains why the 
FTC does not have jurisdiction to regulate the cemetery industry.  Part II 
examines the patchwork of state regulations that currently exist and 
emphasizes the need for uniformity within the industry.  Part III sets 
forth a conditional spending proposal under the confines of National 
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, (NFIB).25  This 
section recommends Congress condition an appropriate percentage of the 
Medicaid grant on states’ compliance with the proposed Minimum 
Guidelines.  Part IV applies the test set forth in NFIB to this proposal.  
Finally, Part V offers an alternative proposal, contending that Congress 
should condition the individual receipt of the Medicaid burial set-aside 
on state compliance with the above-mentioned guidelines. 
I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CANNOT UNDERTAKE CEMETERY 
REGULATION 
In the United States, the FTC is the enforcement body responsible 
for regulating unfair and deceptive trade practices.26  While the FTC has 
the authority to respond to consumer complaints against businesses and 
trade associations,27 its authority does not extend to the cemetery 
industry.28  Part A of this Section provides a comprehensive history of 
the FTC’s Funeral Rule and emphasizes the absence of the cemetery 
industry from the Rule.  Part B sets forth the limitations of the FTC’s 
agency authority and argues that the FTC does not have jurisdiction to 
regulate the cemetery industry or other large non-profit markets. 
 
24. “Tom Dart . . . observe[d] that manicurists and barbers must endure more regulatory 
hurdles than most cemetery operators, including . . . managers and groundskeepers.”  Steven 
Gray, Outside Chicago, a Grim Tale of Unearthed Graves, TIME U.S., July 11, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1910036,00.html#ixzz2AAADvZsY 
(explaining that many states have oversight bodies for trades such as manicurists, but “there is 
no single agency, government or independent, that keeps up-to-date records of how many 
human bodies are buried or cremated on a cemetery’s grounds or the names of the buried”). 
25. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) [hereinafter 
“NFIB”].  This case is also known as the “Obamacare” case.  
26. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012) (showing the establishment of the FTC 
and its jurisdictional authority); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (noting the FTC is empowered to prevent 
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting  commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce”); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of 
Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 227-30 
(1980). 
27. See supra note 26 and statutes cited therein. 
28. See supra note 26 and statutes cited therein. 
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A. The History of the Funeral Rule 
In the 1980s, many complaints began to surface from bereaved 
consumers alleging that unscrupulous funeral providers were deceiving 
and overcharging consumers resulting in profiteering29 and 
mismanagement.30  Many consumers were coerced into paying excessive 
prices for funeral services due to funeral providers who refused to 
deliver adequate pricing information.31  Further, grieving consumers are 
easy prey for providers seeking to sell an abundance of goods.  For 
example, pre-Funeral Rule, providers were adding unnecessary goods 
and services into bundled funeral packages and were misrepresenting the 
need for particular goods under state and federal laws.32  These practices 
were causing consumers “to pay higher than competitive prices for the 
items they purchase[d].”33 
Aware of these complaints, the FTC conducted an extensive 
investigation into the funeral industry.  The Commission found that 
patrons of the industry “are often unable to make careful, informed 
decisions regarding funeral transactions.”34  The investigation further 
revealed that bereaved consumers are “highly vulnerable to unfair and 
deceptive trade practices, and that many funeral providers were 
unlawfully taking advantage of their customers.”35  In 1984 The FTC 
promulgated the Funeral Rule to counteract these consumer abuses and 
encourage transparent pricing and management.  Amended in 1994,36 the 
rule seeks to protect consumers from funeral industry profiteering and 
 
29. Jim Abrams, Report Says Government Lacks Control of Funeral Industry, 
SARASOTA-HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 1999, at 7D; see also Profiteer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profiteer (last visited May 14, 
2014) (defining the term profiteer as “one who makes what is considered an unreasonable 
profit especially on the sale of essential goods during times of emergency”). 
30. See Fred S. McChesney, Consumer Ignorance and Consumer Protection Law: 
Empirical Evidence from the FTC Funeral Rule, 7 J.L. & POL. 1, 7 (1990) (noting the refusal 
of many funeral homes to provide price information to consumers and the use of lump-sum 
pricing makes it impossible for patrons to discern the hidden cost of the components of 
complex funeral package).  
31. Id.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. (citing Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg 42,260, 42,269 (Sept. 24, 1982));  
see also The Bereaved Consumer Bill of Rights: Hearing on H.R. 3655 Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the  H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
111th Cong. 1-2 (2010) (statement of  Representative Bobby Rush), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg76005/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg76005.pdf. 
34. Funeral Consumer Alliance, Inc. v. F.T.C., 481 F.3d 860, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(citing Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260, 42,265-66 (Sept. 24, 1982)). 
35. Id. 
36. Funeral Industry Practices Trade Regulation Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592, 1611 (Jan. 
11, 1994) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453). 
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deceptive trade tactics by imposing a series of regulations on funeral 
providers in areas such as fraud and misrepresentation, required vs. non-
required services, open price disclosures, and retention of documents.37  
Pursuant to the Rule, it is an unfair or deceptive act for funeral providers 
to: 
[F]ail to furnish accurate price information disclosing the cost to the 
purchaser for each of the specific funeral goods and funeral services 
used in connection with the disposition of deceased human bodies, 
including at least the price of embalming, transportation of remains, 
use of facilities, caskets, outer burial containers, immediate burials, 
or direct cremations, to persons inquiring about the purchase of 
funerals.38 
This applies whether the consumer inquires via telephone or in 
person.39  Consumers are encouraged to pick and choose the services 
they need as opposed to services  providers may hide in bundled sales 
packages in an attempt to mask the cost of individual funeral goods.40  
To encourage this transparency, the Funeral Rule also mandates that 
consumers be given a General Price List,41 which must, in a “clear and 
conspicuous manner,” list the prices of all available goods and 
services.42  This aids consumers in making informed decisions when 
patronizing funeral homes.  Further, providers are not allowed to refuse 
services to a consumer because he or she has contracted with a third-
party vendor for goods such as caskets or burial containers.43 
To ensure that consumers receive the goods contracted for, the 
Funeral Rule orders that funeral homes provide a written itemized 
receipt showing exactly what was purchased and the price of each item.44  
By providing this receipt, consumers are able to review and have record 
of their purchase.  While the government saw the need to prevent the 
above mentioned abuses, consumers who patronize the cemetery 
 
37. 16 C.F.R. § 453.1(i) (2013); Elizabeth Howell Boldt, Note, Nail in the Coffin: Can 
Elderly Americans Afford to Die?, 21 ELDER L.J. 149, 161 (2013). 
38. 16 C.F.R. § 453.2(a). 
39. Id. § 453.2(b)(1). 
40. Id.  
41. For the purposes of this Note, a General Price List is “a printed or typewritten price 
list for retention to persons who inquire in person about the funeral goods, funeral services or 
prices of funeral goods or services offered by the funeral provider.”  Id. § 453.2(4)(iA)(1)-(3). 
42. Id. § 453.2(b)(4).  This list must also be provided to consumers who inquire about 
prices via telephone.  
43. Id. § 453.4(b)(10). 
44. Id. § 453.2 (b)(5)(i). 
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industry and who face the exact hardships45 are excluded from the rule 
and left with no federal protection against these abuses.46 
In 2011, Representative Bobby Rush of Illinois introduced the 
Bereaved Consumer Bill of Rights Act to the United States House of 
Representatives.47  The Bill sought to extend FTC oversight to prevent 
unfair and deceptive trade practices in the cemetery industry.48  
Ultimately, after its introduction, the bill was sent to the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce where it died by the close of the 
112th Congress.  To date, no similar bills have been proposed.49  While 
the bill sought to extend the Funeral Rule to the cemetery industry, the 
FTC is not the ideal agency to take on this task.50 
B. Why the FTC Cannot Regulate the Cemetery Industry 
The abuses in the cemetery industry are similar to those that once 
existed in the funeral industry.  As a result, lawmakers and industry 
professionals argue that the Funeral Rule should be expanded to account 
for the cemetery industry.51  This expansion would include adequate 
price lists, itemized bills, and organized record keeping.52  Further, 
cemetarians are now selling goods and services outside of the traditional 
scope of business and should be regulated in some capacity.53  In 
particular, cemeteries have transformed from “sellers of burial plots to 
one-stop, full-service funeral providers, competing against funeral 
homes for sales of every conceivable funeral good.”54  Funeral industry 
professionals argue that excluding cemetarians from federal regulation 
 
45. As mentioned above, these hardships include the inability to make informed 
purchasing decisions, emotional distress, lack of familiarity with the industry, and time 
constraints.  Since the funeral industry and the cemetery industry are so similar, these 
hardships are consistent for both. 
46. See generally Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry 
Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 13740 (Mar. 14, 2008). 
47. Bereaved Consumer’s Bill of Rights, H.R. 3655, 111th Cong. (2009) reintroduced 
as Bereaved Consumer’s Bill of Rights Act of 2011, H.R. 900, 112th Cong. (2011). 
48. Id. 
49. H.R. 900, 112th Cong. (2011). 
50. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 
73 Fed. Reg.13740 (Mar. 14, 2008). 
51. Id. at 13741-2. 
52. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2013). 
53. See, e.g., Services, SPRINGFIELD CEMETERY & CREMATORY, http://www.rocheinter 
net.com/~spce/design/?lv=8 (last visited May 14, 2014) (noting that this Springfield, 
Massachusetts cemetery offers a number of services including cremation, graveside, and 
chapel services). 
54. Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 73 
Fed. Reg. at 13744 (quoting National Selected Morticians (NSM), Comment A-54, at 6-8).  
KADY S. HUFF  
444 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:437 
promotes unfair market conditions.55 
Since the Funeral Rule’s inception, there has been a steady increase 
in national conglomerates acquiring private cemeteries.56  This has 
resulted in an influx of cross-competitors that are not subject to industry 
regulation.57  As a result, nearly all of the funeral providers and other 
industry participants who partook in the FTC’s notice and comment 
period “urged the Commission to ‘level the playing field.’”58 
1. The FTC Has Limited Jurisdiction 
In 2008, during the most recent notice and comment period for the 
Funeral Rule, the FTC rebuffed hundreds of comments vying for the 
expansion of the Rule.59  The FTC reasoned that it could not create a 
new cemetery rule or expand the Funeral Rule because of jurisdictional 
limitations.60  The FTC Act extends the FTC’s jurisdiction only to 
corporations “organized to carry on business for [their] own profit or that 
of [their] members. . . .”61  Since a vast majority of cemeteries are 
organized as non-profits, any extension of the FTC’s jurisdiction “would 
raise serious jurisdictional issues concerning the status of nonprofit 
entities under FTC regulation.”62 
2. Ramifications of Expanding the FTC’s Jurisdiction 
Extending the FTC’s jurisdiction to cover non-profit organizations 
would be problematic.  According to the IRS, “[t]here are reported to be 
between 75,000 and 100,000 cemeteries in the United States.  Most of 
[which] are tax exempt organizations.”63  These entities are predicted to 
outnumber the nation’s estimated 7,500 for-profit cemeteries by at least 
 
55. Id. For example, NSM, a not-for-profit, international trade association of 
independent, privately owned and operated funeral homes, has argued that they are operating 
in an uneven playing field. 
56. Michael B. Sauter & Jon Ogg, 10 Companies that Control the $15 Billion Death 
Industry in America, TOPSTOCKANALYSTS (Jan. 17, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.topstockana 
lysts.com/index.php/2011/01/17/10-companies-that-control-the-15-billion-death-industry-in-a 
merica/.  
57. See Irwin W. Shipper, Request for Comments Concerning the Trade 
Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices 16 CFR Part 453, International Cemetery and 
Funeral Association (ICFA), Comment A-38, [hereinafter ICFA Comment]. 
58. 73 Fed. Reg. at 13744 (noting cemetarians provide almost identical goods and 
services, yet are given a distinct market advantage). 
59. Id. at 13741-2. 
60. Id. 
61. 15 U.S.C § 44 (2012). 
62. See  ICFA Comment, supra  note 57. 
63. See  ICFA Comment, supra  note 57. 
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three to one.64  To further this point, some states strictly prohibit for-
profit cemetery entities from operating within state borders.65  The FTC 
and various industry participants reasoned that regulating only for-profit 
cemeteries would not accomplish the major premise of the Act.66  Only a 
relatively small number of cemeteries would be affected and there would 
be substantial confusion in distinguishing non-profit from for-profit 
entities.67 
 Further, expanding the scope of the FTC Act or Funeral Rule 
would bestow upon the FTC over 400,000 new entities to regulate.68  
This would spread the FTC’s enforcement capabilities very thin.69  As a 
result, the effectiveness of the Funeral Rule might be compromised.  
This, along with the jurisdictional dilemma, makes the FTC an 
inappropriate regulatory body for the cemetery industry. 
II. A PATCHWORK OF STATE REGULATION HAS LED TO GRAVE ABUSES 
WITHIN THE CEMETERY INDUSTRY 
Currently the cemetery industry is regulated (if at all) solely at the 
state level.70  However, states vary dramatically in the laws and 
regulations that they implement and enforce.71  This Section argues that 
the lack of uniformity and industry oversight has led to a disparity in 
consumer protections across the U.S.72  Scandals, like Burr Oak, sparked 
the interest of the Government Accountability Office (GAO),73 which 
conducted a nationwide survey concerning current state regulation of the 
 
64. See  ICFA Comment, supra  note 57. 
65. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 13745; see also GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 11-12 (noting that 
these states include Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and 
Wyoming). 
66. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 13745. 
67. Id. 
68. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 13740. 
69. See generally id. 
70. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1. 
71. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1. 
72. Cemeteries Draw Complaints, supra note 9.  
73. See About the GAO, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited May 
7, 2014) (“The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan 
agency that works for Congress . . . . [the] GAO investigates how the federal government 
spends taxpayer dollars . . . . [the mission of the GAO] is to support . . . Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve . . . performance and ensure the 
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people.”). 
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death care industry.74  This federal inquiry is prima facie evidence that 
the unregulated cemetery industry has been, and continues to be a 
problem of federal concern. 
Part A of this Section analyzes the hardships states face in 
attempting to regulate cemeteries within state borders and highlights 
inconsistencies among state regulators.75  Part B draws comparisons 
between Iowa, which has a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and 
Colorado, which has no comprehensive state regulatory body.  This Part 
seeks to show the varying levels of cemetery regulation across the fifty 
states and calls for uniformity among them. 
A. The 2011 GAO Report Unearthed Inconsistencies Among State 
Regulators 
Widespread media coverage of cemetery mismanagement led the 
GAO to review federal involvement within the death care industry.76  
The focus of this report was how states regulate the industry and whether 
there is a need for additional regulation.77  The GAO found that while 
most states reported having regulations in place for some cemeteries, no 
state reported regulating all cemeteries within its borders.78  One 
problem is that the number of cemeteries operating within a particular 
state is not always known, and often no records are kept at either the 
state or municipal levels.79  Further, there are limited licensing 
requirements across the nation.80  While all funeral providers are 
required to be licensed by federal law, twenty of the thirty-seven states 
surveyed reported that they do not require cemetery operators to be 
licensed and no annual inspections were necessary of cemetery 
premises.81 
 
74. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1. 
75. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1 
76. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1 
77. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1 
78. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 16. 
79. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17. To highlight this point, “18 of the 37 
states surveyed noted that they did not maintain data on the number of cemeteries that operate 
within the state’s borders.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17.  Further, “only five 
states were able to provide comprehensive data on the number of cemeteries within their state. 
The report explained that the states contained a number of cemeteries ranging from 124 to 
3,600.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17. 
80. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17 Noting, “11 [states] reported that 
some but not all cemetery operators are required to be licensed, 1 reported that all are required 
to be licensed, and 5 checked ‘No response.’ State regulators reported that licenses were 
required to be renewed at various frequencies, if at all.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 
15, at 17. 
81. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17.  With respect to inspection, “21 of 
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With lack of inspections in many states, consumer protection issues 
go unnoticed and violations become difficult to track.82  Of the thirty-
four states that responded to this issue on the GAO’s survey, only 
eighteen reported tracking violations of cemeteries.83  Of those states that 
track cemetery misconduct, the most frequent violations included those 
related to “(1) record keeping, (2) maintenance, (3) unprofessional 
conduct, and (4) licensing.”84  The GAO, concluded, “[t]he extent to 
which the federal and state governments regulate . . . cemeteries . . . 
varies.”85  This variance demonstrates the need for regulatory unity 
within the industry. 
B. Contrasting State Cemetery Laws: From Comprehensive to Non-
Existent 
States have proven unsuccessful in regulating cemeteries.  This 
patchwork level of regulation has resulted in some states that have 
comprehensive control over the industry, while others have no 
regulations at all. 
1. Comprehensive Regulations: The Iowa Cemetery Act 
Iowa is one of the few states to enact comprehensive state cemetery 
law.86  For example, the Iowa Cemetery Act87 mandates widespread 
cemetery inspections.88  Under the Act, inspectors examine “the books, 
accounts, papers, correspondence, memoranda, purchase agreements, 
files, or other documents or records of the cemetery.”89  If it is found that 
a cemetarian “is engaged or about to be engaged”90 in an activity 
prohibited under the Act, the cemetarian may be required to cease and 
desist from engaging in such practice and is subject to civil penalties.91  
 
the 37 state regulators who responded to this issue . . . reported that inspections of cemeteries 
were not required, and those that did require them reported that the frequency of the required 
inspections varied.”  GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17.  “The 12 state inspectors 
who responded to our survey question regarding the number of inspectors available to inspect 
cemeteries reported having between zero and nine inspectors.”  GAO, DEATH SERVICES, 
supra note 15, at 18. 
82. See generally Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4. 
83. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15. 
84. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15 at 18. 
85. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 18. 
86. See generally IOWA CODE § 523I.101 (2011). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. § 523I.202(1)(d). 
90. Id. § 523I.203. 
91. Id. 
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Unlike other states that focus on land based regulations for cemeteries,92 
Iowa focuses on consumer protection.93 
In-line with the above assertion, the Act deems it unlawful for a 
cemetarian to misrepresent state or federal law.94  This occurs when a 
cemetarian implies that services such as embalming are required by law.  
This is typically an attempt to coerce consumers into making 
unnecessary purchases.  Further, the Act prohibits cemetarians from 
conspiring to defraud consumers in connection with “the sale of 
memorials, memorialization, opening and closing services, scattering 
services, interment rights, or a combination thereof.”95  In states lacking 
similar provisions, cemetarians are more likely to misrepresent services 
to consumers because they remain unchecked by law.96 
The Act also encourages full disclosure of records and burial plot 
placements.  For example, there is a record keeping provision, which 
requires cemeteries to record the name, addresses, and date of purchase 
associated with each plot.97  Further, each cemetery is responsible for 
establishing, “[a] unique numeric or alphanumeric identifier that identify 
the location of each interment space sold by the cemetery.”98  Along with 
this, a cemetarian must fully disclose all fees required for services such 
as inurnment,99 interment,100 and entombment101 of human remains.102  
While Iowa’s statutory scheme is exemplary, many states are very far 
behind in implementing these types of measures, leaving consumers to 
fend for themselves in purchasing burial goods.103 
2. No State Regulation: Colorado 
Colorado is one state that has historically lacked cemetery 
 
92. See generally id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. § 523I.209-.211. 
95. Id. § 523I.211. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. § 523I.311. 
98. Id. 
99. Funeral Terms and Contact Information, FTC (July 2012), http://www.consumer.ftc 
.gov/articles/0306-funeral-terms-and-contact-information (defining inurnment as “[t]he 
placing of cremated remains in an urn”). 
100. See id. (defining internment as “[t]he burial of a corpse in a grave or tomb, 
typically with funeral rites”).  
101. See id. (defining entombment as “[b]urial in the ground, inurnment or 
entombment”).  
102.  IOWA CODE § 523I.301. 
103. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 61. 
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regulation.104  While it has full consumer protection provisions within its 
“Mortuary Science Code,”105 no provision extends to cemeteries.106  
Because Colorado state law allows residents to care for the dead with 
very few limitations,107 cemetarians who operate in the state are less 
restricted than those operating in other states.108  For example, Service 
Corporation International (SCI)109 owns and operates over seventeen 
cemeteries in the state.110  This is because the only regulations specific to 
the cemetery industry are local and municipal zoning ordinances.111  
There are no laws addressing record keeping or inspections of 
cemeteries.  In fact, the Funeral Board for the State of Colorado no 
longer exists.112 
In late 2012, Colorado enacted a statute to address grievances made 
at non-profit cemeteries.113  The law aims to make non-profit cemetery 
boards transparent and accountable to bereaved consumers.114  The 
statute requires non-profit cemetery operators to keep records of any 
“grave space, niche, or crypt.”115  These records must include an annual 
written report “setting forth the number of interments, internments and 
entombments maintained by the non-profit cemetery.”116  The 
corporation must maintain a copy of the minutes of all board meetings 
for three preceding years, a copy of periodic corporate filings for the 
 
104. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 61. 
105. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-54-106 (2011). The Colorado Mortuary Sciences Code 
seeks consumer protection for the funeral industry.  The given protections include: full 
disclosure of prices and services offered, itemized general price lists, and prohibition of legal 
misrepresentations. 
106. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 62 (noting in Colorado, “[c]emeteries 
are not regulated at the state level”). 
107. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-54-106. 
108. Id. 
109. Find A Local Provider, SERV. CORP. INT’L, http://www.sci-corp.com/SCICORP/Fi 
ndLocalProvider.aspx?alias=0201 (last visited May 9, 2014). 
110. Id. 
111. See generally id. 
112. See Karen E. Crummy, Trinidad Cemetery’s Actions and Finances Under 
Investigation, DENVER POST, Feb. 5, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/investigat 
ions/ci_19895937.  The public was outraged when Trinidad Catholic Cemetery was caught 
dumping headstones and memorial flags behind its facility.  It was further discovered that the 
board of the Catholic cemetery filed inaccurate tax documents.  In another case, the Roselawn 
Cemetery allegedly extorted over $800,000 from it perpetual care fund and then told bereaved 
consumers that the sum was lost in the stock market.  Id. 
113. See generally COLO. REV. STAT.  § 7-47-101 (2012) (amended by Laws 1012, Ch. 
229, § 1 eff. Aug. 8, 2012). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. § 7-47-101 (1). 
116. Id. § 7-47-101 (1)(a). 
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preceding three years, and a copy of the corporation’s Internal Revenue 
Form 990 for the preceding three years.117  Further, under the law, the 
non-profit cemetery boards must include at least one person who owns 
or has a property interest in a grave or burial space.118  This gives 
appointed consumers the ability to attend meetings, review minutes, and 
inspect the otherwise confidential financial records of the subject 
cemetery.119  If the board denies access to the property or the records 
then a court order may be obtained and the cemetery will be held 
accountable for attorney’s fees.120  This enforcement mechanism will 
encourage non-profit cemetarians to operate in an open and obvious 
manner, significantly diminishing the likelihood of mismanagement.  At 
the very least, the records will be open to the public. 
Iowa and Colorado are two examples of states with vastly different 
regulatory schemes for the cemetery industry.  This inconsistency and 
unpredictability of state laws across the United States is evidence that a 
uniform scheme is needed.  Because cemetery regulation at the state 
level has proven ineffective, the federal government must intervene 
through its Spending Clause authority to regulate the industry. 
III. CONDITIONAL SPENDING THROUGH THE MEDICAID GRANT: 
IMPLEMENTING MINIMUM GRIEVING CONSUMER PROTECTION 
GUIDELINES 
Congress’s conditional spending power is enumerated in the United 
States Constitution121 and allows Congress to tax and spend, so long as 
the end result furthers the “general welfare” of the United States.122  
Historically, Congress has used this authorization to attach conditions to 
funding—even when the Constitution itself does not delegate express 
authority to do so.123  For example, Congress has used its spending 
 
117. Id. § 7-47-101(1)(b)-(f). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The Constitution empowers Congress “to lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States.”  Id. 
122. See United States. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding “the power of 
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the 
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution”). 
123. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (1994); see also 
Amanda Staples, Note, Another Small Step in America’s Battle Against Drunk Driving: How 
the Spending Clause Can Provide More Uniform Sentences for Drunk-Driving Fatalities, 46 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 357 (2012). 
KADY S. HUFF  
2014] REMEDYING CEMETARY MISFEASANCE 451 
power to set national drinking ages,124 old age benefits,125 and to 
establish a uniform system for collecting child support.126  Today the 
government spends over 600 billion dollars per-year in federal funding, 
requiring states to comply with attached conditions before 
disbursement.127 
The Supreme Court has continuously upheld “the use of federal 
dollars to promote various policies amongst and within the states.”128  In 
1987, the Court established a permissive test interpreting the spending 
power.129  However, the confines of this test were recently redefined in 
the 2012 term.  Until National Federation of Independent Businesses v. 
Sebelius130 (NFIB), “no Supreme Court decision since the New Deal had 
struck down an act of Congress as exceeding the federal spending 
power.”131 
This Section proposes that since both the FTC and individual states 
are inadequate regulatory bodies, the federal government should 
intervene to encourage states to adopt “Minimum Grieving Consumer 
Protection Guidelines”132 utilizing Congress’s spending power.  The goal 
of these Guidelines is to prevent price misrepresentations and deceptive 
or misleading sales practices within the industry.133  This proposal seeks 
to condition the receipt of an appropriate percentage of Medicaid,134 on 
the adoption of the mentioned Guidelines.135  This means if a certain 
percentage of cemeteries within a state are non-compliant with the 
Guidelines, the state will “opt-out” of a portion of its Medicaid funding.  
This proposal is similar to the plan set forth in NFIB and tests the bounds 
of that case.136 
 
124. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 
207 (1987)).  
125. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639 
(1937)). 
126. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357 (citing Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 
1192, 1195-97 (D. Kan. 1998)). 
127. See Douglas A. Wick, Note, Rethinking Conditional Federal Grants and the 
Independent Constitutional Bar Test, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2010). 
128. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357. 
129.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987).  
130. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012). 
131. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion 
in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013). 
132. See infra App. A. 
133. See infra App. A. 
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2010). 
135. See infra App. A.  
136. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (noting “nothing in [this] opinion precludes Congress 
from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, 
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Part A of this Section explains how the above mentioned 
proposal—like most spending proposals—easily falls within the confines 
of the permissive test set forth in South Dakota v. Dole.137  It particularly 
stresses the importance of the “germaneness prong”138 and seeks to 
emphasize the broad rationale of the Dole Court.  Part III.B analyzes the 
new test established in NFIB and highlights the substantive similarities 
and differences between the proposed plan and the plan at issue in NFIB. 
A. Overcoming the Broad Limitations of the Federal Spending Power: 
South Dakota v. Dole 
While the Supreme Court has interpreted the Spending Clause 
permissively, there are important restrictions to take into consideration.  
These limitations were first developed in Dole.  In Dole, the State of 
South Dakota brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a 
federal statute conditioning states’ receipt of federal highway funds on 
the adoption of a state drinking age of twenty-one years.139  South 
Dakota, at the time, allowed people over the age of nineteen years to 
purchase alcohol.140  The state’s argument, which was rejected by the 
Court, was that the statute violated “the constitutional limitations on 
congressional exercise of the spending power under Art. I § 8, cl. 1 of 
the Constitution.”141  The Court reasoned “[i]ncident to the spending 
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds.”142  However, the exercise of Congress’s spending power is 
subject to certain restrictions.143 
In determining these restrictions, Chief Justice Rehnquist combined 
prior case law to establish an enumerated test for the constitutionality of 
conditions on spending.144  The test set-forth four prongs meant to limit 
federal spending powers.145  First, the spending must be in pursuit of the 
general welfare.146  Second, the condition must be unambiguous and 
 
and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use”). 
137. See generally 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (explaining that “[t]he spending power is 
of course not unlimited . . . but is instead subject to several general restrictions”). 
138. See infra Part A, Section 1 and 2. 
139. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 203. 
140. Id. at 205. 
141. Id. at 203. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See also Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 5 n.26; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 
(setting forth said enumerated test). 
145. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. 
146. Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)); United States 
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). 
KADY S. HUFF  
2014] REMEDYING CEMETARY MISFEASANCE 453 
provide the states with clear notice “of the consequences of their 
participation.”147  In other words, the states must have the tools to make 
a knowledgeable choice whether to accept or reject federal grant money.  
Third, the conditions placed on the funds must be related or germane to 
the federal goals of the grant affected.148  This means there must be a 
rational connection between the purpose of the grant and the conditions 
attached to the grant.  Finally, “other constitutional provisions may [not] 
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”149 
While this test may seem comprehensive, it has been interpreted 
leniently.150  Until NFIB, no court had invalidated funding proposals 
under the Dole test.151  Today, the outer limits of the requirements 
remain undefined by the courts.152  For example,  courts have 
consistently viewed three of the four prongs as implicit,153 while the 
“germaneness” or “relatedness” prong has received some scrutiny by the 
courts.154  The Supreme Court has reasoned, “[c]onditions on federal 
grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest 
in particular national projects or programs.”155  However, since Dole, the 
prong has been held “toothless, even nonjusticiable.”156  Further, “[i]n 
most instances in which the requirement has been a focus of litigation, 
the court has done little more than assert, without analysis or elaboration, 
that the challenged condition is ‘reasonably related to the federal interest 
 
147. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
148. Id.  at 208 (stating “the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of 
the main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel”).  The 
rationale behind this connection is that “[a]chieving uniformity in minimum legal drinking 
ages would . . . induce[] young people to drive to border states with lower drinking ages and 
because, even within a single state, the higher the minimum drinking age, the fewer the 
accidents per mile driven.”  Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: 
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 31 (2001). 
149. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
150. The Court in Dole spoke of a coercion limitation on the government’s spending 
power in dicta but never adopted a rule.  Chief Justice Rehnquist noted “[o]ur decisions have 
recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be 
so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion” but he did not extend 
a bright line rule as to when this occurs and did not include it in the four-pronged Dole test.  
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 5. 
151. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 2. 
152. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to 
Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 466 (2002). 
153. Id.  
154. Id. 
155. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (1987) (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 
444, 461 (1978)).  
156. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 466. 
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in the national program.’”157  This has resulted in the Court upholding a 
wide range of federal spending programs without establishing a clear 
correlation.158 
1. Rationalizing the “Germaneness Prong” of the Dole Test 
The proposed condition—state compliance with Federal Minimum 
Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines—would easily satisfy the 
relaxed nature of the Dole test.  In utilizing the Dole analysis, the only 
prong of the test that needs further clarification is the above mentioned 
germaneness prong.  In Dole, the Court refused to set the outer bounds 
of this limitation.159  For the scope of this proposal, the Medicaid grant 
must be at least rationally related to the cemetery industry.160  While this 
is the most restrictive of the Dole requirements, the Court does not 
expect a perfect means-end fit in deriving the relationship.161 
Medicaid is a federal categorical grant,162 which has a narrow scope 
of eligible state expenses.163  Since its inception in 1965, it has been a 
necessary and important form of assistance for families requiring long-
term care.164  The Medicaid grant is substantially related to the cemetery 
industry under two theories.  First, Medicaid offers eligibility set-asides 
for burial services.  Second, Medicaid funds a state-run hospice program 
that offers after-death and end-of-life services. 
 
 
 
157. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 466. 
158. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 469. 
159. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09. 
160. Id. at 207-08 (noting that case law has indicated “that conditions on federal grants 
might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects 
or programs’”) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).  
161. Id. 
162. Advanced Funeral Planning for Baby Boomers: Medicaid Considerations, 
DIGNITY MEMORIAL, http://www.dignitymemorial.com/dm20/en_US/main/dm/library/article/ 
name/preplanning-medicaid (last visited May 14, 2014). 
163. BEN CANADA, CONG. RES.  SERV., RS20669, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: OVERVIEW AND CHARACTERISTICS 3-4 (2002), available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs1102/m1/1/high_res_d/RS20669_2000Sep07.p
df (explaining “[c]ategorical grants have a narrow range of eligible activities, permitting funds 
to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes.  Discretion over the awarding of 
grants remains at the federal level since Congress defines the categories and federal agencies 
review applications”). 
164. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: 
A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 51-53 (1974). 
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a. The Medicaid Eligibility Set-Aside for Burials and Burial Services 
To be eligible for Medicaid, applicants over a set income level must 
spend-down their assets until they reach a qualifying level.165  However, 
certain assets are considered allowances or set-asides under the 
Medicaid program rules.166  The federal Medicaid statute requires that 
financial eligibility rules correspond to the Social Security 
Administration’s Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI).167  SSI 
explicitly excludes, “the value of any burial space or agreement.”168  The 
program regulations require that burial funds up to $1,500 be excluded 
from assets.169 
For the purposes of Medicaid, a “burial fund”170 is a sum of money 
set-aside and clearly designated to pay for an eligible individual’s burial 
expenses or the burial expenses171 of that individual’s spouse.172  The 
fund must be held separate from other household accounts and labeled 
for its purpose.173  The limit to this fund is $1,500; however, states may 
allow more than this amount to be excluded.174  Payments are made 
directly to the cemetarian upon the submission of particular forms.175  
Burial items covered usually include goods such as “casket[s], urn[s], 
mausoleum[s], vault[s], headstone[s] or plaque[s] . . . [and] the cost of 
opening and closing of the gravesite.”176 
In addition to the burial fund allowance, a Medicaid recipient may 
 
165. Id. 
166. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1231 (2012) (stating, “[i]n determining the resources of an 
individual, the value of burial spaces for the individual, the individual’s spouse or any member 
of the individual’s immediate family will be excluded from resources”).   
167. Todd A. Krichmar, Prepayment of Funeral Expenses for Medicaid and SSI 
Recipients, 69 N.Y. ST. B. J. 42, 43 (1997). 
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (a)(2)(B) (2012); see also § 1382a(b)(16) (requiring 
disregard from SSI income calculation any interest accrued on a burial arrangement).  
169. See id § 1382b (a)(2)(B). 
170. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1231 (2012). 
171. See id. (defining “burial spaces to include, burial plots, gravesites, crypts, 
mausoleums, urns, niches and other customary and traditional repositories for the deceased’s 
bodily remains provided such spaces are owned by the individual or are held for his or her 
use.” Further, the term also includes improvements upon burial spaces “including, but not 
limited to, vaults, headstones, markers, plaques, or burial containers and arrangements for 
opening and closing the gravesite for burial of the deceased”). 
172. See id. 
173. Id.  
174. Id. 
175. Evelyn Frank Legal Resources Program, Paying for Burial— Tips for Qualifying 
for Medicaid or SSI Despite “Excess Resources,” (Aug. 16, 2010), http://wnylc.com/health/afi 
le/46/34/. 
176. Id. 
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also own a burial space without consequence to eligibility.  This is 
typically calculated at free market value.177  Thus, by the Government 
allowing a set-aside for burial expenses, it is allowing eligible members 
to maintain or hold in trust, funds that would otherwise disqualify them 
from Medicaid. 
b. The Medicaid Hospice Benefit and “After Death” Services 
Under the Dole germaneness prong,178 the inquiry into the 
relatedness of the condition and the grant is highly deferential to 
Congress.179  Thus, “if any reasonable relationship between the policy 
goals of a program and the policy goals of the grant condition can be 
discerned, then the grant condition will be upheld.”180  The federal 
Medicaid statute allows states to provide Hospice services for 
terminally-ill patients.181  To date, nearly every state has elected to 
provide the Hospice Benefit.182  Traditionally, Hospice care offers “a 
team-oriented approach to expert medical care, pain management, and 
emotional and spiritual support expressly tailored to the patient’s needs 
and wishes.”183  The concept was developed to ensure that patients die 
with respect and dignity.184  Among other services, Hospice care offers 
bereavement services and after-death planning.185 
As part of the Hospice Benefit provided by Medicaid, the 
regulations provide that a team will care for and comfort the Medicaid 
 
177. Id. 
178. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1987). 
179. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 463. 
180. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 12 (2012). 
181. Lainie Rutkow, Optional or Optimal?: The Medicaid Hospice Benefit at Twenty, 
22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107, 108 (2005). 
182. Jane Tilly & Joshua M. Weiner, End-of-Life Care in the United States, 3 INT. J. 
INTEGR. CARE 3 (2003) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1483949/ 
#r6  (noting “Every state but Connecticut, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South 
Dakota covered hospice under Medicaid [by] 2001”). 
183. NATIONAL HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE ORGANIZATION, HOSPICE CARE: A 
CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO SELECTING A HOSPICE PROGRAM 2 (2009) available at 
http://www.caringinfo.org/files/public/brochures/Hospice_Care.pdf (noting that Hospice care 
“[s]upport is extended to the patient’s loved ones, as well. At the center of hospice is the belief 
that each of us has the right to die pain-free and with dignity”). 
184. Id.  Hospice is generally used for “End-of-life care—the period of time when 
patients are seriously ill with the condition that will cause their death.”  See Tilly & Weiner, 
supra note 182, at 1. 
185. Dianne Rosen, A Hospice Primer, N.J. LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 12 (noting 
that hospice care includes bereavement counseling for family members after the patient dies). 
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patient.186  The team consists of a primary physician who is responsible 
for overseeing medical care and identifying signs of death; a Hospice 
physician who controls pain and provides end of life care; a nurse who 
visits the patient daily and provides on-call services; a home health aide; 
a social worker who makes funeral and burial arrangements and acts as a 
liaison for the patient and the Department of Health and Human 
Services; and a chaplain who provides after-death grief counseling to the 
patient’s family.187 
Since Medicaid allows states to use federal funds for a Hospice 
Benefit, and the Hospice team is expected to support a patient during his 
or her final moments by preparing for burial services and grief 
counseling, there is a substantial relationship between the funds covered 
by Medicaid and the cemetery industry.  Since Medicaid covers this 
expense, withholding funds for state non-compliance with the proposed 
Guidelines is reasonably connected to the original purpose of the grant. 
Further, it is directly in line with the mission of Hospice: to ensure that 
patients die with respect and dignity.  Federal coverage of the Hospice 
Program shows that Medicaid is already covering services that extend 
into the death care and cemetery industries. 
In similar cases where the Supreme Court has analyzed the 
“substantial relation” of federal conditions to a funding source, the 
relationships have been much more attenuated, but faced no scrutiny 
from the Court.  For example, American Civil Liberties Union v. 
Mineta188 held that “under the case law . . . the connection between the 
funding restriction and the purpose of the funding does not have to 
be . . . closely related to withstand a challenge.”189  Similar to the 
relationship between the conditions at question in Dole, a requirement 
that states lose a portion of the benefits they enjoy from federal programs 
is permissible since it is related to the federal interest in maintaining the 
health and welfare of bereaved consumers. 
B. Conceptualizing the Federal-State Relationship: Limitations to 
Conditional Spending Established in NFIB v. Sebelius 
While the proposed Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines fit 
 
186. See 42 U.S.C § 1395x (2013) (stating that the Medicaid Hospice Benefit has an 
interdisciplinary group of personnel which—“includes at least— one physician . . . one 
registered professional nurse, and . . . one social worker . . . and also includes at least one 
pastoral or other counselor”). 
187. Id. 
188. 319 F. Supp. 2d 69, 79 (D.D.C. 2004). 
189. Id. at 80. 
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squarely within the limitations set forth in Dole,190 the fractured opinion 
in NFIB established that the government’s spending power is greatly 
limited when the terms of pre-existing spending programs are 
“substantially and unforeseeably altered.”191  Under this new approach, 
the Court focuses on coercion rather than compulsion.192  This is a 
dramatic re-conceptualization of the prior anti-commandeering doctrine 
and essentially redefines what constitutes a federal command to the 
states.193 
Looking through the lens of the Tenth Amendment194 and the anti-
commandeering principle, the plurality determined the Medicaid 
expansion provision at issue in NFIB to be unconstitutional.195  The 
Medicaid expansion provision aimed to cover individuals not included in 
existing Medicaid coverage groups including “the entire nonelderly 
population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.”196  The 
ultimate goal of the expansion was to reduce the number of uninsured 
Americans by expanding overall access to affordable healthcare.197 
In an attempt to entice states to participate in the conditional 
expansion provision, section 1396c of the Act gave the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services the express authority to “penalize States that 
choose not to participate in [the Medicaid expansion] . . . by taking away 
their existing Medicaid funding.”198  In other words, a state’s failure to 
adopt the provision would result in the complete withdrawal of all 
Medicaid funding.  While the expansion provision was upheld, the Court 
struck the condition that states adopt the provision or lose all Medicaid 
funding.199 
 
190. See supra Section III.A; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
191. James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated 
Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
67 (2012). 
192. Margaret Hu, Reverse Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 554 (2012) 
(nothing “even when Congress does not compel states to act, a law can be struck on anti-
commandeering grounds if the practical impact of the law is one that coerces another 
sovereign’s power”). 
193. Id. at 554-55 (noting that after NFIB the anti-commandeering principle has 
transformed into an “anti-coercion” principle). 
194. U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, no prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
People.”). 
195. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012). 
196. Id.  
197. John K. DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 No. 6 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2012). 
198. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2574-75.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). 
199. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2574-75. 
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NFIB invites a vast array of new coercion challenges to federal 
conditional spending programs, yet the Court refused to articulate a 
bright line test for identifying the level of command that would 
constitute coercion.  Chief Justice Roberts set out key factors to 
determine whether a Spending Clause action is repugnant to the Tenth 
Amendment.  According to Professor Eloise Pasachoff,200 factor one has 
two inquiries.201  Under the first inquiry, the government must identify 
whether the proposed condition is a new and independent program.202  
Under the second, a determination must be made as to whether states had 
clear notice of any modifications made to an existing conditional 
spending program.203  This means the federal government cannot 
unexpectedly alter a grant program by conditioning the receipt of 
existing funds on compliance with a “new” program.  Finally, factor two 
posits whether the condition is so coercive as to hold “a gun to the 
head[s]” of states.204  This means the threat of withdrawing the funds 
cannot be so significant as to constitute “economic dragooning.”205  
According to the plurality, these factors destroy any “real choice” a state 
may have in accepting a grant condition and, as a result, commandeer 
state authority under the Spending Clause.206 
This Note argues that the most effective reading of the NFIB test is 
not to read the above factors as independently operative, but as 
conjunctive.207  For example, Professor Pasachoff describes the NFIB 
Test as follows: 
Does the condition in question threaten to take away funds for a 
program that is separate and independent from the program to which 
the condition in question is attached? [If no, the inquiry stops and the 
condition is upheld.][If so,] . . . did the states have sufficient notice at 
the time they accepted funds for the first program that they would 
also have to comply with the second program? [If yes, the inquiry 
stops.][If not,] . . . is the amount of funding at stake so significant 
 
200. Eloise Pasachoff is an Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center.  Her academic profile is available at: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/pas 
achoff-eloise.cfm. 
201. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of 
Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 593 (2013). 
202. Id.  
203. Id.; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). 
204. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604;  Pasachoff, supra note 202 at 593. 
205. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
206. Id. 
207. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 593. 
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that the threat to withdraw it constitutes “economic dragooning?”208 
The below sections analyze each prong of the NFIB test and 
reiterates Professor Pasachoff’s rationale as it relates to the cemetery 
industry.  
1. New Programs and Independent Grants 
While it is clear from the NFIB plurality that conditioning the 
receipt of existing federal funding on compliance with a new program 
may be coercive, there is little guidance from the Court as to when a 
condition ultimately transforms an existing program into a “new 
program.”209  In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts and the plurality reasoned 
that the Medicaid expansion provision was “a shift in kind, not merely 
degree.”210  This shift sought to establish “a comprehensive national plan 
to provide universal health insurance coverage”211 rather than a program 
to cover only four categories of individuals as originally established.212 
Under this rationale, the proposed expansion to Medicaid was 
extremely broad and transformed the program by making it almost 
universal.213  However, mere alterations or expansions on a smaller level 
may not rise to a “shift in kind.”214  For example, in Dole the condition 
“was imposed on a separate, independent program, and there were no 
new funds attached to that condition.”215  The Court reasoned that in 
Dole, the condition was reasonably foreseeable and did not expand the 
program in such a transformative way.216 
Upon a determination that a condition threatens to terminate 
existing funds, the next inquiry “is whether the states had notice at the 
time they first accepted funding under the first program that they would 
also have to comply with the second program.”217  If adequate notice was 
provided, then the anti-commandeering principle does not apply and 
there is no Tenth Amendment violation.218  However, “[i]f the states did 
not have proper notice, then the question becomes whether the terms of 
 
208. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 594. 
209. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at  2603-05; Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 596. 
210. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
211. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606. 
212. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606. 
213. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 599 (quoting NFIB, 132 S.Ct at 2605-06). 
214. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at  2575; see also Pasachoff, supra note 202, at 600. 
215. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600. 
216. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600. 
217.   Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600-01. 
218. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600-01. 
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the financial inducement constitute economic dragooning.”219 
2. Clear Notice of Contractual Terms 
Many legal scholars support the notion that the Spending Clause 
establishes a contractual relationship between the federal government 
and each individual state.220  In this situation, the government is the 
offeror and the state is the offeree, bound only by acceptance of the 
terms.221  This contractual framework serves as a protective measure to 
safeguard states’ ability to opt out or refrain from participating in federal 
programs.222  NFIB reaffirmed that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ 
exercise of the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.”223  Thus, states must 
have reasonable notice of the terms of the new condition. 
However, the Court makes little inquiry as to what satisfies this 
“reasonable notice” requirement.  In NFIB, the plurality reasoned that 
the states lacked clear notice of the Medicaid expansion provision 
because states could not reasonably expect the program to be modified 
or expanded in such a broad manner.224  In coming to this rationale, 
Chief Justice Roberts strictly interpreted the rule of Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital v. Halderman.225  He reasoned, when states first 
enroll in a federal grant program, Congress must provide reasonable 
notice of conditions that might later be imposed.226  Professor Pasachoff 
contends that Chief Justice Roberts’ notice requirement hinges on the 
conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was a separate program from the 
existing grant.227 
Thus, “[t]he notice the plurality actually required, then, is not notice 
of any change to the program Congress might make in the future, but 
notice that the states would have to participate in a separate, independent 
program if they want to participate in the first program.”228  There was 
no indication from the plurality that a state must be aware of all future 
 
219. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600-01.  “Economic dragooning” is discussed infra 
Part III.B.3. 
220. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 
DUKE L.J. 345, 391 (2008); see also Staples, supra note 122, at 358.  
221. Id.  at 386. 
222. Id.  at 386. 
223. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 591 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at  2602 ). 
224. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 591. 
225. See 465 U.S. 89 (1984).  
226. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012). 
227. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 602. 
228. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 602. 
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conditions that could be placed on the grant at the time the program is 
first implemented.229 
At the inception of the Medicaid Act, states “signed on” with the 
knowledge that Congress reserved “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal 
any provision of [Medicaid].”230  In fact, the Medicaid program has been 
altered on numerous occasions without facing viable constitutional 
challenges.231  For example, new conditions have been imposed on the 
existing grant money in the past, yet no immense questioning was 
warranted by the Court.232  Said amendments were viewed as mere 
modifications.  Under the authorization provision above, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that the federal government gave notice that “mere 
alterations” could be made to the existing program.233  
3. State Participation in Cooperative Federalism: Economic 
Dragooning and the “Real Choice” Test 
The second prong of the NFIB test establishes yet another limitation 
on Congress’s spending power.234  Here the Court considered the 
ramifications of the government inducing states’ compliance with federal 
spending programs through financial enticement.235  Under Professor 
Pasachoff’s reasoning, this prong is triggered “only if the condition in 
question threaten[s] to take away funds from an independent program 
 
229. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 602.  Professor Pasachoff draws a comparison 
between NFIB and Dole.  Concerning Dole she notes: 
There is no chance that when states took funds under that Act in 1982 they could 
have foreseen that a 1984 law would require them to raise their drinking age or lose 
some NFIB funding under the Act.  Yet the plurality did not conclude that the 
subsequent amendment was therefore coercive. 
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 603. 
230. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part); 42 U.S.C. § 1304 
(2013). 
231. See Thomas, supra note 180, at 13 (noting “[m]any of the amendments to 
Medicaid imposed grant conditions that, if not met, would result in the loss of all Medicaid 
funding . . . . [for example] the various Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1381–
1382, 1465 (extending Medicaid eligibility, but partly conditioning only the new funding); 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388–166 (extending 
eligibility, and conditioning old and new funds)”).   
232. Thomas, supra note 180, at 13. 
233. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
234. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 46 (noting the “anti-coercion principle operates as a 
limit on Congress's power to spend for the general welfare when conditions are placed on 
states' acceptance of that spending. The Court has previously recognized structural limits on 
other federal powers, but NFIB was the first clear articulation of a federalism-based limit on 
Congress's spending power” (citation omitted)). 
235. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 
(1987)). 
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and if that condition [was] added after the state[] first joined the original 
program.”236  While previous case law has recognized challenges based 
on coercion—the language was left only in dicta.237  The plurality’s 
decision in NFIB marked the first time in history the Court 
acknowledged coercion as more than a “theoretical possibility”238 under 
the Spending Clause.  As a result, a new framework for coercion analysis 
was established.239  This framework sets forth a series of interconnected 
factors that the Court used to find the all-or-nothing condition attached 
to the Medicaid expansion provision coercive. 
First, as independent sovereigns, states must be given a real choice 
whether or not to accept a government condition on a federal grant.240  In 
the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts determined “[t]he threatened 
loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic 
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in 
the Medicaid expansion.”241  Roberts further stated “[i]n this case, the 
financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than 
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”242  If states do 
not have a true choice to refrain from the imposed condition, then the 
spending condition is in violation of the Tenth Amendment and is 
coercive.243 
Second, the Court looked at the percentage of individual state 
budgets that would be affected by the condition.  After NFIB, it is clear 
that “all-or-nothing” provisions, under which states stand to lose all 
 
236. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 605. 
237. See Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 46-47 (noting “[t]he Rehnquist Court bypassed 
several opportunities to recognize a Tenth Amendment [coercion] limit in direct Spending 
Clause challenges such as Dole and New York v. United States”).  For example, “Rehnquist 
recognized that ‘in some circumstances, the financial inducement offered by Congress might 
be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”  Huberfeld, 
supra note 131, at 46-47. 
238. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 577; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part). 
239. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 577.  The Dole Court spoke of coercion noting, 
“[b]ut to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in 
endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical 
determinism by which choice becomes impossible.”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S 548, 590 (1937)). 
240. Pasachoff, supra note 202, at 592. 
241. NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2604 (plurality opinion) (comparing the five percent condition 
accepted in Dole as mere “mild encouragement” to the threatened loss of all Medicaid funds, 
which constitutes over 10% of some  states’  overall budgets).  
242. Id.  
243. Id. 
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existing funding, will be labeled as coercive.244  However, what is less 
clear is what percentage of affected funding rises to the level of 
coercion.  For example, no case conditioning less than “all-or-nothing” 
has ever been struck down by the Court for being coercive.245  Professor 
Pasachoff notes, “the effect of the federal funding on the state budget is 
key.”246  However, Chief Justice Roberts and the plurality did not give 
bright line numbers or levels under which conditions on funding would 
rise to coercion. 
In fact, the only direction for future cases is based on an 
amalgamation of case law beginning with Dole.247  In Dole, only one-
percent of  South Dakota’s budget was affected.248  There, the 
inducement was characterized explicitly as “relatively mild 
encouragement.”249  At the other end of the spectrum, in NFIB, many 
states would have faced a ten percent state budget cut.  Thus, Professor 
Pasachoff explains, “[f]or both the plurality and joint dissent, . . . the line 
for financial inducement that crosses the line to coercion is a threatened 
loss [to state budgets of] somewhere between less than 1% and as much 
as 10% of a state’s overall annual expenditures.”250 
Chief Justice Roberts stated, “[t]he size of the new financial burden 
imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the State has been 
coerced into accepting that burden. ‘Your money or your life’ is a 
coercive proposition, whether you have a single dollar in your pocket or 
$500.”251  This statement posits that it is a judicial decision as to whether 
a particular grant condition is coercive and in violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.252  The focus is on the bottom line and not the actual dollar 
amount. 
Finally, the Court looks at political accountability in limiting 
 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 605 (referring to the plurality opinion and noting that 
20% of the average state’s budget goes to Medicaid payments, “with the federal government 
covering 50 to 83% of those payments”).   
247. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 606 (quoting the plurality in NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 
2604).  
248. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 204 (1987). 
249. Id. at 211. 
250. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 606 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605). 
251. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at n.12. 
252. Id. at 2606-07.  The Roberts plurality relies on Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis in its 
decision to refrain from establishing a bright line test to determine what constitutes coercion. 
301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937).  In that case, the Court determined that it did not know where the 
line fell, but the statute in question was well within it.  Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts also 
refrained from establishing a bright line rule.  
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expansive congressional authority.253  For example, “[w]here all 
Congress has done is to ‘encourag[e] state regulation rather than 
compe[l] it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s 
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.  [But] 
where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the 
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.’”254 
Even after the NFIB decision, distinguishing enticement versus 
coercion is difficult.  The dissent  stated, “[c]ourts should not conclude 
that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground unless the coercive 
nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”255 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED MINIMUM GRIEVING 
CONSUMER PROTECTION GUIDELINES UNDER THE NFIB 
TEST 
It is likely the proposed condition would survive a facial 
constitutional challenge.  Both the plurality and the joint dissent 
reaffirmed that Congress can use its spending power to entice states to 
enact certain government policies or programs.  However, the 
government may not compel or coerce states to act.256  This proposal 
seeks to condition an “appropriate percentage” of the Medicaid grant on 
state compliance with the Minimum Guidelines.  This Section applies 
the NFIB analysis (as presented by Professor Pasachoff ) to this proposal 
and demonstrates there are no Tenth Amendment limitations barring the 
implementation of the Guidelines. 
A. Does the Implementation of Federal Minimum Grieving 
Consumer Protection Guidelines “Threaten to Take Away Funds 
for a Program That Is Separate and Independent from the 
Program to Which the Condition in Question is Attached?”257 
As mentioned above, “the plurality [in NFIB] began by 
distinguishing between two types of spending conditions that Congress 
might conceivably impose: conditions on the use of federal funds and 
conditions that threaten to take away federal funds for other 
programs.”258  The latter type of condition is now considered 
 
253. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 65. 
254. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2660 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 
(1992)).  
255. Id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
256. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992). 
257. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 583. 
258. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 596. 
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“constitutionally suspect” under NFIB and warrants a coercion 
analysis.259  The implementation of Minimum Grieving Consumer 
Protection Guidelines cannot fairly be read as a “new and 
independent”260 program under the NFIB rationale.  While the 
implementation of the Guidelines does condition the receipt of existing 
Medicaid funds on state acceptance of the Guidelines, the proposed 
implementation mirrors the condition at stake in Dole.261 
Further, the implementation would not jettison the ultimate purpose 
of Medicaid—to provide healthcare “to the neediest among us.”262  
Instead, the proposed Guidelines would merely modify the grant in ways 
no more expansive than other historical modifications.263  For example, 
the plurality noted “[t]he original [Medicaid] program was designed to 
cover medical services for four particular categories of the needy: the 
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent 
children.  Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered 
and expanded the boundaries of these categories.”264  Chief Justice 
Roberts found the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expansion went beyond a 
mere expansion and was an attempt to provide “a comprehensive 
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”265 
The proposed Guidelines, on the other hand, simply seek to expand 
upon services for the Medically Needy and the Aged categories.266  The 
Medicaid program would remain unified even after the implementation 
of the Guidelines.  The burial eligibility exception267 and the Hospice 
Benefit268 demonstrate that the scope of Medicaid already encourages 
after-life services and care for the Aged and Medically Needy categories 
of Medicaid recipients.  Given that Medicaid already pays for burial 
planning through its regulation of Hospice teams, including social 
workers and bereavement counselors,269 it is not unreasonable that 
Medicaid funding cover state expenses to eradicate cemetery 
misfeasance.  The additional proposed regulation is minimal, and as 
 
259. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 596. 
260. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 594. 
261. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 594.  
262. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012). 
263. See Blumstein, supra note 191 (noting the various accepted changes to the 
Medicaid Program). 
264. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06 (citation omitted). 
265. Id. at 2606. 
266. See infra App. A. 
267. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1231 (2012). 
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (2013). 
269. See id. 
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such, could not be said to cause “a shift in kind.”270 
If a condition merely alters the outer boundaries of previously 
existing statutes, “the more likely it is that the change works no shift in 
kind.”271  Alternatively, the more a condition can be said to change “a 
program by exploding the concept of statutory categories or by making 
those statutory categories so broad that they start to become 
‘comprehensive’ or ‘universal,’ the more likely it is that the change is a 
shift in kind rather than degree.”272  However, if a court were to 
determine the proposed Guidelines constitute a new and independent 
program (or a shift in kind), then the court would move to the next 
question. 273 
B. “[D]id the States Have Sufficient Notice at the Time They 
Accepted Funds for the First Program That They Would Also 
Have to Comply with the Second Program?”274 
Once a program condition is found to be a “new and independent 
program,” the question turns to whether the notice of the condition was 
accurate and whether it was accepted knowingly and voluntarily.275  The 
NFIB plurality noted that “[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under 
the spending power is broad, it does not include surprising participating 
States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”276 
In 1965, when states signed on to the Medicaid program, there was 
a clause reserving for Congress “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any 
provision” of that statute.277  Agreeing to this provision, “each State 
expressly undertook to abide by future Medicaid changes.”278  Since 
 
270. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.  The Plurality left ambiguous what constitutes a “shift in 
kind.”  
271. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 599. 
272. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 599. 
273. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 598. 
274. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 612. 
275. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 612. 
276. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (quoting 
Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1980)).  
277. See id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013) 
(noting Congress has reserved “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this 
chapter”).  “In Pennhurst, residents of a state-run, federally funded institution for the mentally 
disabled complained of abusive treatment and inhumane conditions in alleged violation of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.”  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2637.  The 
Court held that the State was not liable because it did not “voluntarily and knowingly 
accep[t]” the terms.  Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).  The 
take away rule from Pennhurst is “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of 
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.”  Id. 
278. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1) (2011); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639. 
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then, “Congress has repeatedly amended and expanded Medicaid ‘with 
both mandatory and optional features, often as part of broader policy 
initiatives.’”279  Thus, it is well settled that if states have proper notice of 
a condition from the outset, then it is unlikely it will be coercive under 
the NFIB analysis.280 
States must be able to foresee future alterations that Congress might 
make.  In 1985, Hospice Care was introduced as an optional Medicaid-
covered benefit.281  While Medicaid was intended to cover health 
services for society’s most needy, it is unlikely that states could foresee 
that Medicaid would condition the receipt of a portion of existing 
funding to ensure that cemeteries avoid misfeasance and ensure 
consumer protections that have—until this proposal—remained 
unregulated at the federal level.  According to Professor Pasachoff, this 
“simply means that the . . .  inquiry should proceed to the third stage, 
asking whether the financial inducements are so significant as to 
constitute economic dragooning.”282 
C. “Is the Amount of Funding at Stake So Significant That the 
Threat to Withdraw It Constitutes Economic Dragooning?”283 
In NFIB, the Court inquired whether “the financial inducement 
offered by Congress [was] so coercive as to pass the point at which 
‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”284  As mentioned above, the plurality 
did not elaborate or set a bright line test as to when pressure becomes 
compulsion.285  To overcome this hurdle, the proposal at hand seeks to 
condition an appropriate percentage of the Medicaid grant on state 
compliance with Minimum Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines.  
This is done to essentially model the proposal set-forth in Dole.  Since 
the drinking age condition in Dole targeted one percent of the state 
budget and the Medicaid expansion provision threatened a loss of ten 
percent of individual state budgets, it is likely the proposed appropriate 
percentage would fall somewhere in between.  This proposal is vastly 
different from the Medicaid expansion provision, which threatened 
100% of existing Medicaid funding. 
 
279. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 21. 
280. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 21. 
281. Rutkow, supra note 181, at 11. 
282. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 603. 
283. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 612. 
284. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (quoting 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).  
285. Id. 
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This proposal is much closer to the “mild encouragement” 
rationalized in Dole.286  While some portion of funding will be lost if 
states choose not to comply, such a small percentage is at stake that 
states are still left with a “real choice” whether to participate.  Under the 
rationale set-forth by Professor Pasachoff, the above test should be read 
conjunctively.287  This means the proposed grant condition must fail both 
the notice inquiry as well as the economic dragooning test to be 
unconstitutionally coercive.  Thus, it is likely the implementation of the 
proposed Minimum Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines would 
survive a facial constitutional challenge. 
V. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: ATTACHING THE PROPOSED 
FEDERAL CONDITION TO THE BURIAL ELIGIBILITY 
ALLOWANCE 
This Note proposes that as an alternative to attaching the proposed 
condition to an appropriate percentage of the Medicaid grant—the 
federal government should attach the condition to the individual receipt 
of the Medicaid eligibility allowance provision for burial spaces and 
burial funds.288  This means individual Medicaid recipients who 
patronize cemeteries deemed non-compliant with the proposed federal 
guidelines will be ineligible to receive the eligibility set-asides and will 
have to spend-down income in other ways to meet the asset limit and 
maintain Medicaid eligibility.  Part A of this Section explains the 
relationship between the “Medically Needy” category of Medicaid 
recipients and the Medicaid eligibility set-aside for burial goods and 
services.  Part B of this Section offers a comprehensive analysis of the 
policy implications and rationale behind the proposal.  Finally, Part C of 
this Section compares this proposal to similar cases that were deemed 
constitutional. 
A. The “Medically Needy” Category as a Means of Regulating the 
Cemetery Industry 
Typically only the “Medically Needy” category of Medicaid 
recipients will have to spend-down assets to become eligible for the 
program.289  Recipients in this category usually have high medical 
expenses, as well as incomes that exceed the maximum allowed 
 
286. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
287. Pasachoff, supra note 201. 
288. See supra Part II.A.1. 
289. Alison Barnes, An Assessment of Medicaid Planning, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 265, 271 (2003).  
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threshold.290  For example, “[e]lderly [people] living in nursing homes 
and children and adults with disabilities who live in the community and 
incur high healthcare costs comprise a large portion of spending in the 
medically needy program.”291  In fiscal year 2009,292 there were 
approximately 2.8 million enrollees in this category, resulting in over 36 
billion-dollars in federal Medicaid funding.293  The medically needy 
option is complicated for potential members to navigate.294  It is 
generally thought to provide an important safety net for people whose 
medical costs greatly exceed their incomes.295  As a result, the ability to 
spend-down is very important for these individuals.296 
While Medicaid allows for various set-asides in determining 
eligibility,297 the exception relevant to this Note is the value of burial 
items up to $1,500.  It is important to note that states are permitted to use 
less restrictive methodologies in counting resources under the medically 
needy program, but they may not be more restrictive.298  This means 
some states allow a set-aside of more than $1,500, but all states are 
required to allow at least that amount.299  Further, in conjunction with the 
burial fund allowance, the value of a burial space or an agreement with a 
cemetarian representing the value of a burial space is also excluded from 
the claimant’s countable resources.300  Only one plot per individual 
member may be excluded.301 
B. Rationale Behind Penalizing the Individual Rather Than the 
State 
The underlying policy implication behind this proposal is that 
Medicaid recipients, who account for approximately sixty-seven million 
individuals in the United States, will be incentivized to enter into 
 
290. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID 
MEDICALLY NEEDY PROGRAM: SPENDING AND ENROLLMENT UPDATE 1 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/4096.pdf [hereinafter Kaiser 
Comm’n]. 
291. Id.  
292. Id. 2009 is the most recent survey date. 
293. Id. at 16. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (2012). 
300. Id. 
301. Other exclusions include: the value of the potential member’s home, personal 
effects, and an automobile.  See id. 
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business relationships with cemeteries that comply with the Minimum 
Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines.  Knowing members will be 
over the eligibility asset limit; they will avoid non-compliant cemeteries 
and opt for cemeteries that follow the proposed federal guidelines.  This 
proposal would side-step the NFIB test because it does not materially 
alter the existing Medicaid program.  It has long been understood that 
Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare.  However, 
Congress also has the authority to attach conditions to the funds that the 
recipient must accept to receive the funds.302  As opposed to the entire 
program, this second proposal seeks to attach the condition to the 
individual’s choice of cemeteries. 
While Congress has this authority, there is a fine line between 
compelling and incentivizing individuals to act in a certain way.  Neither 
the Commerce Clause, nor the Spending Clause gives Congress the 
authority to compel individuals to engage in commerce.  However, by 
incentivizing individuals to patronize cemeteries that comply with 
federal guidelines, the federal government is regulating a market in 
which citizens freely decided to engage.  Medicaid members have the 
option to embrace the condition. This proposal would not be so coercive 
as to “hold a gun” to the individual’s head because even those who 
become ineligible for the burial allowance may spend-down income 
through other allowances.  Thus, they are afforded many more options 
than states affected by the all-or-nothing approach in NFIB. 
C. Attaching Condition to the Individual: A Look at Prior Case 
Law 
The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that Congress 
can condition federal funds on actions of individuals and individual 
businesses.  For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that the Government could selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest.303  He 
further noted, “[w]hen the Government appropriates public funds to 
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”304 
However, Chief Justice Roberts limited this notion in NFIB.  He 
noted: 
Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States 
to act in accordance with federal policies. But when “pressure turns 
 
302. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987). 
303. 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991). 
304. Id. at 194. 
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into compulsion,” the legislation runs contrary to our system of 
federalism . . . .“The Constitution simply does not give Congress the 
authority to require the States to regulate.”  That is true whether 
Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces 
a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.305 
Both NFIB and Dole rationalize the federal-state relationship 
concerning the Spending Clause.  However, Spending Clause 
jurisprudence also allows Congress to attach conditions to the individual 
or businesses in their individual capacities. 
For example, in Steward,306 the Court determined that “[an] 
unemployment compensation scheme offered as an option to the states, 
which was designed to induce the states to enact conforming legislation 
for private employees, did not violate the Tenth Amendment because the 
states were not coerced into adopting the legislation.”307  Similar to the 
Steward decision, the proposal at hand seeks to offer the Medicaid 
eligibility set-aside only to those potential recipients who patronize 
cemeteries in compliance with the proposed rules. This seeks to induce 
cemetarians to comply with the proposed guidelines as well as 
individuals to utilize only those cemeteries deemed to be in compliance.  
Like Steward, there is nothing in this proposal that suggest an “exertion 
of power akin to undue influence . . . .”308 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As William Shakespeare said “[t]he evil that men do lives after 
them; . . . [t]he good is oft interred with their bones.”309  The cemetery 
industry is left as one of the few unregulated industries in the United 
States.  Thus, consumers should not blindly rely on cemetery providers 
to implement adequate consumer price protections.  As mentioned, the 
industry has shifted from selling grave plots—to a vast array of funeral 
goods and services.310  Both Congress and the FTC have recognized the 
conditions within the industry that make it susceptible misfeasance, but 
have failed to provide bereaved consumers with an adequate remedy.  
 
305. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (quoting New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).  
306. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
307. Los Angeles County, Cal. v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (D.D.C. 1977) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Steward 301 U.S. at 548. 
308. Steward, 301 U.S. at 590; see also Marshall, 442 F. Supp. at 1190. 
309. Act 3, Scene 2, THE LITERATURE NETWORK, http://www.online-literature.com/sha 
kespeare/julius_caesar/10/ (last visited May 20, 2014).  
310. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry 
Practices, 64 Fed. Reg. 35965 (July 2, 1999). 
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The potential for another Burr Oak scandal continues to exist and reports 
of misconduct continue to surface.311 
If every state adopted comprehensive consumer protection 
regulations, like those promulgated by Iowa, the probability of 
misconduct would diminish significantly.  Because states have chosen 
not to do so, it is the federal government’s duty to act.  With the new test 
set forth in NFIB, it is likely that both of the proposed conditional 
spending programs would survive a facial constitutional challenge. 
Kady S. Huff∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311. See generally News One, Families Claim Relatives’ Bodies Lost in Cemetery 
Scheme, CHICAGODEFENDER (Jan. 30, 2014), http://chicagodefender.com/2014/01/30/families 
-claim-relatives-bodies-lost-in-cemetery-scheme/.  
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APPENDIX A: 
PROPOSED MINIMUM GRIEVING CONSUMER PROTECTION GUIDELINES312 
A. PRICE DISCLOSURES:313 It shall be an unfair or deceptive act for cemetarians 
or cemetery providers to fail to: 
1. Furnish accurate price information disclosing the cost to the purchaser 
for each of the specific goods and services used in connection with the 
disposition of deceased human bodies, including: 
i. The price of embalming; 
ii. transportation of remains; 
iii. use of facilities including mausoleums; 
iv. caskets; 
v. outer burial containers; 
vi. immediate burials; or 
vii. direct cremations. 
2. Provide accurate price information including the cost of the burial plot 
and any other cemetery expenses to: 
i. Persons who inquire in person about cemetery and 
cemetery expenses and offerings or prices including those 
goods and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines 
and any other readily available information that 
reasonably answers the question; 
ii. Persons who inquire via telephone about cemetery and 
cemetery expenses and offerings or prices including those 
goods and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines 
and any other readily available information that 
reasonably answers the question 
iii. Persons who inquire via e-mail or other forms of 
electronic communication about cemetery and cemetery 
expenses and offerings or prices including those goods 
and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines and any 
other readily available information that reasonably 
answers the question; 
iv. All other person who inquire about cemetery and 
cemetery expenses and offerings or prices including those 
goods and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines 
and any other readily available information that 
 
312. Note: these guidelines are a compilation and adaptation of the cited sources and 
seek to serve as a representative, but not comprehensive, example of the consumer protections 
that are missing from the cemetery industry.  
313. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2013). 
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reasonably answers the question. 
B. GENERAL PRICE LIST:314 It shall be an unfair or deceptive act for 
cemetarians or cemetery providers to fail to: 
1. Provide all consumers with a typewritten price list which clearly states 
the prices of all caskets or alternative containers, as well as headstones, 
burial plots, and other cemetery goods and services; 
2. Provide consumers with said list prior to showing any casket, alternative 
container, headstone, or other cemetery good or service; 
3. Provide an adequate General Price List which includes: 
i. The retail price of all cemetery goods and services for 
sale including but not limited to caskets, alternative 
containers, headstones, and burial plots; 
ii. The price range for the immediate burials offered by the 
funeral provider, together with: 
iii. A separate price for an immediate burial where the 
purchaser provides the casket; 
iv. Separate prices for each immediate burial offered 
including a casket or alternative container;  
v. A description of the services and container (where 
applicable) included in that price; 
vi. Notation of items requiring special ordering 
vii. The effective date of the price list 
viii. The name, address, and contact information of the 
cemetarians or cemetery provider 
ix. Identification of the cemetarian’s place of business and 
corporate affiliation if any. 
C. MISREPRESENTATIONS:315 It shall be a deceptive act or practice for a 
cemetery provider to; 
1. Represent that state or local law requires outer-burial container when 
such is not the case; 
2. Represent that state or local law requires the purchase of other goods 
and services when such is not the case; 
3. Fail to disclose that particular cemetery goods and services are not 
required by state or local law; 
4. Represent that a deceased person is required to be embalmed for 
immediate burial; or 
5. Fail to provide a bereaved consumer with all written rules and 
 
314. Id. 
315. Id. § 453.3. 
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regulations and a clear explanation in writing of the interment, 
inurnment, or entombment right that has been purchased, and any 
material terms and conditions of that purchase, including any 
repurchase option by the cemetery or resale rights available to the 
consumer. 
D. LISTING OF OPENING  AND CLOSING SERVICES: A cemetery shall disclose, 
prior to the sale of interment rights, whether opening and closing of the 
interment space is included in the purchase of the interment rights.  If 
opening and closing services are not included in the sale and the cemetery 
offers opening and closing services, the cemetery must disclose that the 
price for this service is subject to change and disclose the current prices for 
opening and closing services provided by the cemetery.316 
E. INTERMENT RIGHTS: A person owning interment rights may sell those rights 
to third parties.  The cemetery shall fully disclose, in the cemetery’s rules 
and regulations, any requirements necessary to transfer title of interment 
rights to a third party.317 
F. CASH ADVANCE PROVISIONS: It shall be a deceptive act or practice for a 
cemetery provider to: 
1. Represent that the price charged for a cash advance item is the same as 
the cost to the funeral provider for the item when such is not the case; 
or 
2. Fail to disclose to persons arranging funerals that the price being 
charged for a cash advance item is not the same as the cost to the 
cemetarian for the item when such is the case. 
G. INSPECTIONS: All cemeteries shall be required to: 
1. Retain all records in existence on the date of enactment of these 
guidelines including maps or other systems indicating the location and 
date of each interment, inurnment, or entombment; 
2. Accurately record and retain records of all interments, inurnments, or 
entombments occurring, as well as any internment, inurnment, or 
entombment rights sold; and 
3. Make such records available to Federal, State, and local governments, as 
appropriate. 
H. RETENTION OF DOCUMENTS:318  Cemetery providers must  retain and make 
available for inspection true and accurate: 
1. Copies of the price lists specified in Section B of these guidelines; 
2. Records detailing the name and contact information of all patrons of the 
 
316. See IOWA CODE § 523I.301 
317.  See id. § 523I.301. 
318. 16 C.F.R. § 453.6. 
KADY S. HUFF  
2014] REMEDYING CEMETARY MISFEASANCE 477 
cemetery including the date of inurnment, internment, or entombment.  
3. Records detailing the contract information of patron indicating the price 
they paid for their cemetery goods and services. 
I. DECLARATION OF INTENT:319 It is a violation of these guidelines to engage 
in any unfair or deceptive acts or practices specified herein or to fail to 
comply with any of the preventive requirements so specified. The 
provisions of this rule are separate and severable from one another. If any 
provision is determined to be invalid, any remaining provisions shall 
continue in effect. 
 
 
        319. 16 C.F.R. § 453.8. 
